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Summary. The behavior of complex networks under attack depends strongly on
the specific attack scenario. Of special interest are scale-free networks, which are
usually seen as robust under random failure or attack but appear to be especially
vulnerable to targeted attacks. In a recent study of public transport networks of 14
major cities of the world we have shown that these networks may exhibit scale-free
behaviour [Physica A 380, 585 (2007)]. Our further analysis, subject of this report,
focuses on the effects that defunct or removed nodes have on the properties of public
transport networks. Simulating different attack strategies we elaborate vulnerability
criteria that allow to find minimal strategies with high impact on these systems.
1 Introduction
A number of different phenomena related to complex networks [1] may be described
in terms of percolation theory [2]. Take for example a network built following given
construction rules. Then, how should the rules be tuned such that an infinite con-
nected component is constructed with finite probability and what are the properties
of this class of networks when the parameters reach the corresponding percolation
threshold? Taken that percolation is in general seen as a critical phenomenon one
may expect to find power laws in the vicinity of this point. The network (class)
being described by more than one parameter, there are also many scenarios to cross
the threshold exhibiting different behavior of the observables. Related questions are:
how do infections spread on a network and are there optimal immunization strate-
gies? These and similar questions are best formulated within percolation theory [2]
generalized from its original formulation for regular grids to general network graphs.
In this paper we intend to apply concepts of complex network theory [1] to
analyze the behaviour of urban public transport networks (PTNs) under successive
removal of their constituents. In particular, continuing our recent study of PTNs of
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14 major cities of the world [3,4], we analyse their resilience against targeted attacks
following different scenarios.
It has been observed before that the behaviour of a complex network under an
attack that removes nodes or links may drastically differ from that of regular lattices
(i.e. from the classical percolation problem). Early evidence of this fact was found
analysing real world scale-free networks: the www and the internet [5,6], as well as
metabolic [7], food web [8], and protein [9] networks. In these studies, the interest was
in the robustness of these networks subject to the removal of their nodes. It appeared
that these networks display an unexpectedly high degree of robustness under random
failure. However, if the scenario is changed towards “targeted” attacks, the same
networks may appear to be especially vulnerable [10,11].
To check the attack resilience of a network, different scenarios of attacks have
been proposed: e.g. a list of vertices ordered by decreasing degree may prepared
for the unperturbed network and the attack successively removes vertices according
to this original list [12, 13]. In a slightly different scenario the vertex degrees are
recalculated and the list is reordered after each removal step [5]. In initial studies
only little difference between these two scenarios were observed [11], however further
analysis showed [14,15] that attacks according to recalculated lists often turn out to
be more harmful than the attack strategies based on the initial list, suggesting that
the network structure changes as important vertices or edges are removed. Other
scenarios consider attacks following an order imposed by different ‘centralities’ of
the nodes, e.g. the so-called betweenness centrality [15]. In particular for the world-
wide airport network, it has been shown recently [16, 17] that nodes with higher
betweenness play a more important role in keeping the network connected than
those with high degree.
As it turns out, the behavior under attack of different real-world networks, even
if they are scale-free differ considerably; e.g. computer networks behave differently
than collaboration networks, see [15]. Therefore, it is important to investigate in
how far the behaviour under attack of different real-world networks is consistent
or shows strong variations. Below we present some results of our analysis for the
PTNs of 14 major cities of the world (see Ref. [3] and chapter [4] of this volume
for a detailed description of the included PTNs). A more complete survey will be a
subject of a separate publication [18].
2 Observables and attack strategies
In the analysis presented below we consider the PTNs of the following cities: Berlin
(number of stations N = 2996, number of routes M = 218), Dallas (N = 6571,
M = 131), Du¨sseldorf (N = 1544, M = 124), Hamburg (N = 8158, M = 708), Hong
Kong (N = 2117, M = 321), Istanbul (N = 4043, M = 414), London (N = 11012,
M = 2005), Los Angeles (N = 46244, M = 1893), Moscow (N = 3755, M = 679),
Paris (N = 4003, M = 232), Rome (N = 6315, M = 681), Sa˜o Paolo (N = 7223,
M = 998), Sydney (N = 2034, M = 596), Taipei (N = 5311, M = 389). This
sampling includes cities from different continents, with different concepts of planning
and different history of the evolution and growth of the city and its PTN. For the
purpose of this paper let the PTN of a given city be given by the routes offered in this
network. Each route services a given ordered list of stations. Representing the PTN
in terms of a graph, we apply the following mapping: each station is represented
Attack Vulnerability of Public Transport Networks 3
by a node; any two nodes that are successively serviced by at least one route are
connected by a single link. We note that there are several other ways to represent
a PTN as a graph [3, 4, 19, 20]. The particular representation that we use here is
referred to as a L-space in Refs. [3, 4,20].
The importance of a node i of a given networkN may be measured by calculating
a number of graph theoretical indicators. Besides the node degree ki, which in our
representation equals the number of nearest neighbours z1(i) of a given node i,
different centralities of the node may be defined as follows (see e.g. [21]:
closeness centrality CC(i) =
1P
t∈N ℓ(i, t)
, (1)
graph centrality CG(i) =
1
maxt∈N ℓ(i, t)
, (2)
stress centrality CS(i) =
X
s6=i6=t∈N
σst(i), (3)
betweenness centrality CB(i) =
X
s6=i6=t∈N
σst(n)
σst
. (4)
In Eqs. (1)–(4), ℓ(i, t) is the shortest-path length between a pair of nodes i, t that
belong to a network N , σst is the number of shortest paths between two nodes
s, t ∈ N , and σst(i) is the number of shortest paths between nodes s and t that
go through the node i. When observing a network under attack we will also record
the next nearest neighbours z2(i) and the clustering coefficient C(i) of all remaining
nodes n. The latter is the ratio of the number of links Ei between the ki nearest
neighbours of i and the maximal possible number of mutual links between them:
C(i) =
2En
ki(ki − 1)
. (5)
Note that the mean values of all the above introduced quantities are well-defined
for a connected network N . However, some of the analysed PTNs consist of several
disconnected components even before any perturbation is applied. Moreover, the
number of components naturally increases when nodes are removed. Therefore, we
restrict averages of the observables to the largest network component GCC ⊂ N .
We will indicate these averages by an over-line. Nevertheless, some of quantities are
also well defined for the whole network, the corresponding average will be denoted
by angular brackets. An example we note the inverse shortest path length:
〈ℓ−1〉 =
2
N(N − 1)
X
i>j
ℓ−1(i, j) (6)
where the summation spans over all N sites of the (possibly disconnected) network
and defining ℓ−1(i, j) = 0 if nodes i, j are disconnected. Note that in this case 〈ℓ〉 is
obviously ill-defined.
In what follows, we will pursue a number of different attack strategies or selection
rules and criteria to remove the nodes (vertices). In particular, the scenarios are the
following. “Random vertex” (RV): vertices (nodes) are removed in random order.
“Random neigbour” (RN): one by one, a randomly chosen neighbour of a randomly
chosen node is removed. This scenario appears to be effective for immunization
problems [22] and it is based on the fact, that this way nodes with a high number
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of neighbors will be selected with higher probability. In further scenarios nodes are
removed according to the lists prepared in the order of decreasing node degrees
(k), centralities (C(C), C(G), C(S), C(B)), the number of their second nearest
neighbours (z2), and increasing clustering coefficient (C). The latter seven scenarios
can be either implemented according to lists prepared for the initial PTN before the
attacks (we indicate the corresponding scenario by a subscript i, e.g. Ci(C)) or the
list is built by recalculating the order of the remaining nodes after each step. This
way we follow sixteen different strategies in attacking the networks. The observed
changes of the properties of the PTN under these attacks are described in the next
section.
3 Numerical results
The theory of complex networks is concerned with the properties of ensembles of
networks (graphs) that are characterized e.g. by common construction rules. Such
an ensemble is said to be in the percolation regime if even the infinite graphs in
this ensemble have a connected component that contains a finite fraction of their
nodes. This component is referred to as the giant connected component GCC. If
the ensemble properties are controlled by some parameter, e.g. the concentration of
active nodes, then the percolation threshold in terms of this parameter is defined
as the value at which the network ensemble enters the percolation regime. In the
present case of finite networks we denote by GCC the largest connected component
of a given network. For the finite networks defined by the PTN we analyze the
behaviour of the their largest component that contains NGCC nodes. We introduce
the normalized largest component size S by:
S =
NGCC
N
× 100%. (7)
In Fig. 1 we show the behavior of S for the attack strategies described above for the
PTNs of Dallas and Paris. At each step of the attack 1% of the nodes is successively
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Fig. 1. Attacks on PTNs of (a) Dallas and (b) Paris. Each curve corresponds to a
different attack scenario as indicated in the legend, see text. Horizontal axis: percents
of removed nodes, Vertical axis: normalized size S of the largest component.
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removed following the selection criteria of the given scenarios. The effectiveness of
the attack scenarios may be judged by their impact on the value of S. As it is
clearly seen from Fig. 1, the least effective is the scenario of removing random nodes
(RV): it is characterized by the slowest decrease of S. Another obvious conclusion
is that scenarios based on lists calculated for the initial network (marked by a
subscript i) appear to be less harmful than those, that are based on recalculated
lists. Note however that the difference between ’initial’ and ’recalculated’ scenarios
is less evident in the strategies based on the local characteristics, as e.g. the node
degree or the number of second nearest neighbours (c.f. curves for k, ki and z2, z2i,
respectively). The above difference is even more pronounced for the centrality-based
scenarios. A principal difference between attacks on the highest degree nodes on the
one hand, and on the highest betweenness nodes on the other hand is that the first
quantity is a local, i.e. is calculated from properties of the immediate environment
of each node, whereas the second one is global. Moreover, the first strategy aims
to remove a maximal number of edges whereas the second strategy aims to cut as
many shortest paths as possible. Our analysis shows that the most effective are
those scenarios that are either targeted at nodes with the highest values of the
node degree k, the betweenness centrality CB , the next nearest neighbour number
z2, or the stress centrality CS recalculated after each step of the attack. Figs. 2, 3
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Fig. 2. Four attack scenarios for different PTNs (with recalculation): attacks tar-
geted at nodes of the highest (a) degree k, (b) number of second neighbours z2, (c)
betweenness centrality CB , or (d) stress centrality CS. Vertical and horizontal axis
as in Fig. 1.
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show that the order of destructiveness of these scenarios differ for PTNs of different
cities. However, among the scenarios analyzed so far these four appear to be the
most effective ones.
Another interesting quantity that we may deduce from Fig. 2 is the vulnerabil-
ity of the network in terms of the level of destruction at which the largest network
component breaks down. We observe that this is strongly correlated to the initial
value of the so called Molloy-Reed parameter κ = z2/z1 of the unperturbed network.
Considering model networks that are randomly built from sets of nodes with given
degree distributions it has been shown that the value of κc = 1 represents the perco-
lation threshold in such networks [22,23]. A value much larger than κc then indicates
a significant distance from the threshold. The values of this parameter for the PTN
studied here are: Dallas (κ = 1.28), Istanbul (1.54), Los Angeles (1.59), Hamburg
(1.85), London (1.87), Berlin (1.96), Du¨sseldorf (1.96), Rome (2.02), Sydney (2.54),
Hongkong (3.24), Sa˜o Paolo (4.17), Paris (5.32), Moscow (6.24). Comparing in par-
ticular with Fig. 2 a) we find indeed that the higher the initial κ value the less
vulnerable the network appears to be.
To more precisely define the threshold region for the concentration of removed
nodes we observe the behaviour of the maximal ℓmax and mean ℓ shortest path
lengths under attack, as shown in Fig. 3. We focus on the recalculated degree scenario
(k). Both maximal and average path lengths display similar behaviour: initial growth
and then an abrupt decrease when a certain threshold is reached.Obviously, removing
the nodes initially increases the path lengths as deviations from the original shortest
paths need to be taken into account. Further removing nodes then at some point
leads to the breakup of the network into smaller components on which the paths
are naturally limited by the boundaries which explains the sudden decrease of their
lengths. For the PTN of Paris we observe that this threshold is reached for both lmax
and ℓ at the same value of csegm ≃ 13%. The average shortest path on all components
of the network, 〈ℓ〉, also possesses a maximum in the same region (for the PTN of
Paris it occurs at c ≃ 13%). However, the values of csegm differ for different cities
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Fig. 3. Highest degree scenario. Horizontal axis as in Fig. 1. (a) Behavior of the
maximal and mean shortest path lengths for the Paris PTN calculated for the largest
component (ℓmax, ℓ) and for the whole network (ℓmax,f , < ℓ >f). Note a sharp
maximum occurs at 13 % of removed nodes (stations) for ℓmax, ℓ, ℓmax,f . (b) Behavior
of the maximal shortest path length ℓmax for the PTNs of different cities.
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(see Fig. 3,b) and obviously strongly depend on the attack scenario.
As discussed the observed maximum in ℓmax (or in ℓ) appears to be a suitable
criterion to identify the values of c (or at least the region in c), where the segmen-
tation of a network occurs. Other observables which resemble an ’order parameter’,
are the above described largest connected component size S, Eq.(7), or the average
value of the inverse shortest path 〈ℓ−1〉 (6) are less suitable for this purpose because
of their rather smooth behaviour. In Fig. 4 we show for PTNs of fourteen cities the
behavior of < ℓ−l > under attacks following the four most harmful scenarios, i.e. the
recalculated highest k, CB z2 and CS scenarios. Comparing the impact of different
attacks scenarios (as seen in particular in Fig. 3, 4) one notices that the apparent
relative impact strongly depends on the choice of the observable (e.g. S or < ℓ−l >).
It is worth to note the statistical origin of the data exposed so far. Different
instances of the same scenario may differ to some extent. This is obvious for the
random RV or RN scenarios, where the nodes are removed according to a random
procedure. However, it remains true even for the attacks following pre-ordered lists
of nodes. Obviously, several nodes may have the same value with respect to a given
characteristic (e.g. k, z2,or one of the centrality indices). Then, the choice between
these nodes is random. To check the dispersion of the results, Figs. 5, 6 show the
results of 10 complete attack sequences for the same scenario. Fig. 5 shows the
change in the largest connected component S of the PTNs of Dallas (a), Hongkong
(b), and Paris (c) for the random vertex (RV) scenario. The scatter of the curves
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Fig. 4. Behaviour of < ℓ−l > for PTNs of different cities under attack following four
different scenarios, see text: a) highest k, b) highest CB, c) highest z2, d) highest
CS. Horizontal axis as in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 5. Impact and variance of the random vertex (RV) scenario on the normalized
size S of the largest component for the PTNs of (a) Dallas, (b) Hongkong, and (c)
Paris. Ten curves of different colour indicate different instances of the same scenario
for each city. Vertical and horizontal axis as in Fig. 1
.
in each figure provides an idea about the deviations between individual samples.
The figures also clearly show that even attacked randomly, PTNs of different cities
may display a range of different behaviour: from the comparatively fast decay of the
largest connected component (as in the case of Dallas, Fig. 5a) to very slow, nearly
linear decay (as in the case of Paris, Fig. 5c).
The dispersion in the largest connected component size S is much less for se-
quences of targeted attacks. In Fig. 6 we show the behavior of the largest cluster
size and the maximal and mean shortest path lengths for the Paris PTN for ten
complete attack sequences following the recalculated degree (k) scenario. Besides
a rather narrow scattering of the data for S one notes, that within the current
resolution the locations of the maxima in ℓmax and ℓ are very robust.
To give an idea for the numerical values of different characteristics of the PTN
as monitored during our analysis we display in Table 1 some data for the PTN of
Paris for the recalculated degree scenario for some points of the sequence between
the unperturbed network and the vicinity of the threshold (maximum of the shortest
path lengths).
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Fig. 6. Ten instances of the recalculated highest degree scenario for the PTN of
Paris, observing: a) the largest connected component size S, b) the maximal shortest
path length ℓmax, c) the mean shortest path length ℓ. Horizontal axis as in Fig. 1
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Table 1. PTN of Paris during an attack sequence following the recalculated degree
scenario. c: % of removed nodes; N : number of remaining nodes; k = z1: mean
node degree; z2/z1: ratio of the mean second to the mean first nearest neighbour
number; ℓmax: maximal shortest path length; ℓ: mean shortest path length; 〈ℓ
−1〉:
mean inverse shortest path length (for all of the remaining network); CC , CG, CS,
CB : mean closeness, graph, stress, and betweenness centralities; C: mean clustering
coefficient; S: normalized largest component size.
c N k = z1 z2/z1 ℓmax ℓ 〈ℓ
−1〉 CC CG CS CB C S
0 3728 3.73 5.32 28 6.41 0.17 0.004 5.47 38167 10062 0.079 99.87
1 3691 3.25 3.40 34 8.08 0.13 0.003 4.64 40419 12912 0.073 97.85
5 3543 2.52 2.05 41 13.35 0.07 0.002 3.60 50496 20439 0.062 88.81
10 3358 2.00 1.43 70 24.84 0.03 0.002 2.02 53654 30406 0.044 68.45
12 3284 1.84 1.25 93 39.44 0.01 0.001 1.42 56218 36097 0.036 50.40
13 3247 1.77 1.19 115 41.49 0.01 0.003 1.21 31803 18404 0.039 24.41
14 3210 1.70 1.13 67 29.69 0.00 0.008 1.90 11915 6598 0.022 12.37
4 Conclusions
In this paper we reported on some results concerning the behavior of PTNs under
attacks. Similar to other real-world and model complex networks [5–9,15], the PTNs
manifest very different behaviour under attacks of different scenarios. With some
notable exceptions they appear to be robust to random attacks but more vulnerable
to attacks targeted at nodes with particular importance as measured by the values
of certain characteristics (the most significant being the first and second neighbour
numbers, as well as the betweenness and stress centralities). The observed difference
between attack scenarios based on the initial and the recalculated distributions
shows that the network structure changes essentially during the attack sequence.
This is necessarily to be taken into account in the construction of efficient strategies
for the protection of these network.
As a suitable criterion to identify the level of resilience, i.e. the number of re-
moved nodes that leads to segmentation it is useful to observe the behaviour of the
maximal shortest path length ℓmax. For the majority of PTNs networks we have ana-
lyzed here this observable displays a sharp maximum as function of the removed node
concentration which indicates the breakup of the network. Other ’order-parameter-
like’ variables like the largest connected component size S or the average value of
the inverse shortest path 〈ℓ−1〉 are less suitable for this purpose because of their
smooth behaviour. Another observation is that in the recalculated highest-degree
attack scenario for the segmentation often occurs at a value of κ = z2/z1 ∼ 1 (see
e.g. Table 1 for Paris). Although the PTNs are correlated structures, the above
estimate resembles the Molloy-Reed [23] criterion for randomly built uncorrelated
networks. Further investigation is needed to understand the mechanisms that lead
to higher resilience against random failure as observed e.g. for the Paris network
and how this behavior is related to the network architecture.
As mentioned in the introduction, there are different graph representations, also
called ‘spaces’, for a given PTN [3, 4, 19, 20]. These will also lead to different con-
10 C. von Ferber, T. Holovatch, Yu. Holovatch
nectivity relations and path lengths between nodes. The resilience of PTNs in these
more general ‘spaces’ will be discussed elsewhere [18].
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